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 1 Introduction
Many theoretical and empirical works in the corporate ﬁnance literature have investigated the logic
behind corporate capital structure choice. Modigliani and Miller (1958), a seminal classic paper
in capital structure theory, argued that the dispersion of corporate capital structure among ﬁrms
has nothing to do with their optimization. However, numerous empirical works have established
clear relationships between capital structure and other characteristics of ﬁrms such as size and
proﬁtability, which suggest that their capital structure choice is related to their proﬁt maximiza-
tion.1 Given the stylized facts established by the empirical works, the theoretical works following
Modigliani and Miller (1958) have investigated the cross-sectional determinants of corporate capi-
tal structure. Among other theoretical works, the dynamic trade-oﬀ theory, which describes ﬁrms’
dynamic choice of their capital structure under the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial
distress costs, has succeeded in quantitatively accounting for the stylized facts. While most papers
based on the dynamic trade-oﬀ theory are very recent and are still not suﬃciently well developed
to explain some stylized facts, this theory is now the most promising theory among the theoretical
models that quantitatively account for corporate capital structure.
In this paper, I construct a structural model based on the dynamic trade-oﬀ theory and investi-
gate the following quantitative questions, which have not been fully investigated by previous works.
First, I examine whether the dynamic trade-oﬀ theory can explain the distribution of corporate
capital structure observed in the real economy. This question cannot be answered by standard
dynamic trade-oﬀ models because most of them are partial equilibrium models, focusing on a cer-
tain ﬁrm’s optimal behavior. Therefore, deriving a cross-sectional distribution in equilibrium is
outside their scope. In order to overcome this shortcoming, I extend the model to a dynamic
general equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous entry/exit a la Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993). By doing so, I obtain not only an optimal policy for each ﬁrm, but also an
equilibrium cross-sectional distribution regarding ﬁrms’ characteristics such as ﬁrm size and capital
structure.2 Then, I use the distribution as a natural counterpart of the empirical distribution in
data for comparison.
Second, I examine whether the trade-oﬀ theory accounts for the relationship between corporate
capital structure, ﬁrm size, and proﬁtability. I focus on the relationship between those three vari-
1Bernanke et al. (1990) and Frank and Goyal (2008) discuss the distribution of leverage based on US data. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) use the G7 countries’ cross-sectional data and investigate the cross-sectional relationships between
corporate capital structure and other characteristics of ﬁrms such as proﬁtability and ﬁrm size. Fama and French
(2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) use US ﬁrm panel data and obtain similar results. Lemmon et al. (2008) also uses
US panel data and emphasizes the ﬁxed eﬀect of each ﬁrm. Graham and Harvey (2001) collect extensive survey data
from the chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers (CFOs) of the US ﬁrms and explore the key determinants of their capital structure
decisions.
2Another way to obtain a cross-sectional distribution in a structural model is to generate simulated data and
construct a distribution using them [e.g., Strebulaev (2007)]. This approach does not consider the distribution itself
as an equilibrium, but it is conceptually very similar to the stationary equilibrium approach in this paper.
1ables because there is little disagreement on the relationship in the empirical works.3 In particular,
I focus on the following stylized facts about the relationship.
1. The correlation between proﬁtability and ﬁrm size is positive.
2. The correlation between leverage and ﬁrm size is positive.
3. The correlation between leverage and proﬁtability is positive, but it becomes negative if
the data are limited to large ﬁrms.
4. The correlation between leverage and proﬁtability is negative after controlling for ﬁrm size.
As far as I know, no structural model simultaneously accounts for these stylized facts. In particular,
although the size dependency of the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability has been inves-
tigated empirically, its microfoundations are not even mentioned in existing theoretical papers.4 As
the potential mechanisms to explain those stylized facts, I incorporate the following two features
into the dynamic trade-oﬀ model. One feature is idiosyncratic productivity shocks of two types
(transitory and persistent) and the other feature is economies of scale. While these features are
common in other literature and justiﬁed by empirical works, they are not usually incorporated in
dynamic trade-oﬀ models. In the quantitative part of this paper, I test whether the combination of
those two features and the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs quantitatively
account for those stylized facts.
Finally, through counterfactual experiments, I provide an answer to one of the most recurrent
questions in the corporate ﬁnance literature: Which cross-sectional determinants are relevant to
corporate capital structure choice? In the experiments, I drop frictions from the baseline model
one by one and recalculate the equilibrium. Then, I measure the eﬀect of the friction on corporate
capital structure by comparing average and aggregate leverage in the new equilibrium with average
and aggregate leverage in the equilibrium of the baseline model.
The main ﬁndings of this paper are summarized as follows. First, I ﬁnd that the model’s
equilibrium distribution accounts for the features of the distribution of corporate capital structure
in the US economy. In particular, it accounts for the fact that (1) more than 30% of ﬁrms are
almost-zero leverage ﬁrms, and (2) leverage of nonzero leverage ﬁrms considerably diﬀers from ﬁrm
to ﬁrm.
Second, I ﬁnd that the equilibrium distribution also accounts for the stylized facts regarding
the relationship between capital structure, ﬁrm size, and proﬁtability. In particular, it accounts
3In the empirical works, a growth expectation measured by the market-to-book ratio is often considered as one
of the determinants, but there is no agreement on the sign of the eﬀect on book leverage in the empirical works.
For example, while Fama and French (2002) argue that it is positive, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Lemmon et al.
(2008) argue that it is negative. Frank and Goyal (2009) show the sign of the eﬀect varies over time and conclude
that it is not stable over time.
4For references to empirical papers that address size dependency, see Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Covas and
DenHaan (2011).
2for the four stylized facts stated above. The logic in the model is as follows. The ﬁrst stylized
fact is explained by economies of scale. In this model, the economies of scale emerge because a
ﬁxed cost dampens small ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, measured by ROA, more signiﬁcantly than it dampens
large ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. The second stylized fact emerges in the model as a combination of two
correlations. In the model, productivity and leverage are positively correlated for two reasons. First,
they expand the ﬁnancing deﬁcit (the gap between investment and internal funds) because they
have good investment opportunities, and the ﬁnancing gap is mainly ﬁlled by debt. Second, the debt
market is more accessible to the ﬁrms under the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress
costs. Productivity and ﬁrm size are also positively correlated because the optimal size of ﬁrms
with high productivity is large. Those two positive correlations result in the positive correlation
between size and leverage. The key mechanism behind the third stylized fact is the diﬀerence
between responses to the persistent and transitory productivity shocks. An intuitive explanation
is as follows. On the one hand, as a combination of the ﬁrst and the second stylized facts, a
persistent productivity shock causes a positive correlation between leverage and proﬁtability. On
the other hand, a transitory productivity shock causes a negative correlation between leverage and
proﬁtability. That is, while the transitory productivity shock decreases leverage by pushing up the
level of the ﬁrm’s internal funds, it increases proﬁtability measured by ROA by increasing proﬁt
(the numerator) without aﬀecting ﬁrm size (the denominator). When I measure the correlation
between proﬁtability and leverage, the eﬀect of the persistent productivity is more relevant for
corporate capital structure choice on average, inducing the positive correlation between leverage
and proﬁtability (the ﬁrst part of the third stylized fact). However, the eﬀect of the transitory
productivity shock becomes more relevant among large ﬁrms because the economies of scale caused
by ﬁxed costs are very weak among them, inducing the negative correlation between leverage
and proﬁtability (the second part of the third stylized fact). Finally, the fourth stylized fact is
interpreted as follows. When controlling for ﬁrm size, ﬁrm size absorbs the eﬀect of the persistent
productivity because ﬁrms with high persistent productivity become large. Thus, proﬁtability in
the regression just captures the eﬀect of transitory productivity, and the sign of the coeﬃcient on
proﬁtability becomes negative.
Finally, I discover the following implications about the relative importance between the cross-
sectional determinants of capital structure through counterfactual experiments. First, even if the
tax beneﬁt created by corporate income tax does not exist, the aggregate and average leverages
would not signiﬁcantly change. This is in contrast to previous works. This contrast stems from
the diﬀerence in the assumptions about ﬁrms’ entry/exit. That is, in the case without ﬁrms’
entry/exit in the standard dynamic trade-oﬀ model, all ﬁrms would eventually use 100% equity
by accumulating their internal funds when the tax beneﬁt does not exist. However, in the case
with ﬁrms’ entry/exit, young ﬁrms always exist and use debt in the process of accumulating their
internal funds as long as outside equity is more costly than debt.5 Second, when the costs of
5This may answer the question of why debt ﬁnance was a popular funding method before corporate income tax
3outside equity such as the dividend tax and the ﬂotation cost of equity are eliminated, in addition
to the tax beneﬁt, all ﬁrms use 100% equity ﬁnance. Third, when only the costs of outside equity
are eliminated, the sign of the eﬀect on leverage depends on the ﬁrm size, proﬁtability, and age.
Big, rich, and old ﬁrms increase their leverage whereas small, poor, and young ﬁrms decrease their
leverage. The nonlinear results obtained up to this point imply that the eﬀects of the tax beneﬁt
and the costs of outside equity are highly interrelated with each other. Fourth, the default cost has
a large eﬀect on corporate capital structure choice. Fifth, the investment irreversibility magniﬁes
the disadvantage of debt ﬁnance, but it has no eﬀect on leverage when the costs of outside equity
do not exist.
Related Literature
After the Modigliani–Miller theorem claimed that corporate capital structure is irrelevant to a
ﬁrm’s optimization, many theoretical papers have explored what makes the ﬁrm’s capital structure
relevant to its optimization.6 While the trade-oﬀ theory, which explains corporate capital structure
by the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress costs, is one of the most accepted
theories, another well-accepted theory is called the pecking order theory [e.g., Myers (1984)]. This
theory claims that asymmetric information makes the capital structure relevant, and implies that
ﬁrms prefer internal funds, debt, and outside equity, in that order. There are also other models
to explain corporate capital structure using asymmetric information. Tirole (2006) reviews those
models. Stiglitz (1973) argues that the cost of outside equity generated by the tax on stock returns
makes the capital structure relevant. He showed that, with the tax, a ﬁrm’s behavior would be
similar to the pecking order situation.
The most closely related literature to this paper is the dynamic trade-oﬀ theory. In particular,
Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007) are the most related papers in the literature. They assume
endogenous investment and payout policy as well as endogenous capital structure choice, as in
this paper, and account for the negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability. The most
important diﬀerence between my model and theirs is that their model is a partial equilibrium
model, focusing on a certain ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure choice, whereas this paper is a general
equilibrium model with endogenous entry/exit. In addition, because their model does not consider
the decomposition of productivity and economies of scale, it seems unable to account for the
relationship between leverage, proﬁtability, and ﬁrm size simultaneously. Tserlukevich (2008) uses
a model with endogenous investment and shows that the negative relationship between leverage
and proﬁtability emerges if ﬁrms face very severe investment irreversibility. DeAngelo et al. (2011)
was introduced. Frank and Goyal (2008) comment in their conclusion that “The US corporate income tax did not
begin until 1909, when it was introduced at a 1% rate. The use of debt contracts by businesses has a much longer
history than does the corporate income tax. Thus, while taxes probably play an important role, there must be more
to it.”
6See Frank and Goyal (2008) for a recent survey of this literature. It surveys several stylized facts regarding
corporate capital structure as well as a vast number of empirical and theoretical papers.
4account for a conservative ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing behavior by incorporating an exogenous debt capacity
into a dynamic trade-oﬀ model with endogenous investment and payout.
Another type of dynamic trade-oﬀ model is a continuous time model with a stochastic proﬁt
process and adjustment costs, which was pioneered by Fischer et al. (1989). Strebulaev (2007)
focuses on the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability, as this paper does, and accounts
for it by adjustment costs for rebalancing capital structure. Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010)
investigate the eﬀect of a temporary shock in addition to a persistent shock, as this paper does,
and argue that it induces a more conservative ﬁnancing behavior. Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006)
incorporate a ﬁxed adjustment cost for capital structure and account for the positive relationship
between leverage and ﬁrm size. These recent papers adopt a similar quantitative method to this
paper in order to obtain cross-sectional implications, but the most striking diﬀerence is that a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt and investment as well as payout policy are totally exogenous in those papers. Therefore, it is
not obvious whether the results shown in those papers are still valid under endogenous investment
and the payout assumption because they cannot consider the eﬀect of the ﬁnancing deﬁcit (the gap
between investment and internal funds), which is said to be an important determinant of corporate
capital structure.
I use a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms as a baseline model. An inﬂuential
classic paper in this literature is Hopenhayn (1992). He proposes an economic model with ﬁrm
heterogeneity and shows the existence of a competitive equilibrium with a stationary distribution of
ﬁrms’ characteristics. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) extend the Hopenhayn model to a dynamic
general equilibrium model, and use the model to obtain the aggregate implications of a ﬁring
tax. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) introduce ﬁnancial intermediaries and a debt contract into a
heterogeneous ﬁrm model. While they do not focus on capital structure, but on the size and age
dependency of ﬁrms’ characteristics, this paper adopts the same contractual environment used
in their model. Gomes (2001) introduces capital accumulation into a general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous entry/exit. While he focuses on the logic behind the
cash ﬂow eﬀect on investment, I use the same quantitative method proposed in his model to test
cross-sectional stylized facts. Gourio (2008) shows that it is important to decompose idiosyncratic
productivity into persistent and transitory parts. He assumes that ﬁrms simultaneously face several
types of productivity shocks and then structurally estimates the parameters of the productivity
process, using a structural model similar to this paper. Miao (2005) is the only paper investigating
corporate capital structure using a general equilibrium model with entry/exit. He accounts for
some characteristics of corporate capital structure and entry/exit behavior using a heterogeneous
ﬁrm model, but he makes a number of simpliﬁcations to obtain a closed form solution, whereas this
paper focuses on a quantitative solution under more realistic circumstances.7
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model. Section 3
7For example, Miao assumes a perpetual bond that pays a ﬁxed amount of coupons, and the amount is ﬁxed after
they enter the economy.
5calibrates the model and computes a stationary equilibrium. Section 4 describes some empirical
implications of the model and does counterfactual experiments, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and en-
dogenous entry/exit, as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Gomes (2001). Because ﬁrms are
assumed to be hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, but not aggregate productivity shocks, the
model has a competitive equilibrium with a stationary distribution regarding ﬁrms’ characteristics.8
The economy consists of three types of agents: ﬁrms, households, and ﬁnancial intermediaries
(FIs). The ﬁrm produces consumption goods using assets and labor in every period. It ﬁnances
the asset by three ﬁnancing sources: internal funds, outside equity, and debt. Note that the ﬁrst
two sources are listed as “equity” and the third one is listed as “debt” in its balance sheet. As a
result of the optimal choice between the three ﬁnancing sources, the capital structure is determined
endogenously in the model.
The household is homogeneous and inﬁnitely lived, and maximizes its lifetime utility given
consumption and labor supply. The household’s ﬁnancial asset consists of the shares of ﬁrms and
a risk-free deposit at the FI. Its income consists of wages, dividends on the shares, and interests on
the deposit. The household uses the income to buy consumption goods and new shares, and the
rest is deposited at the FI at the risk-free rate.
The last agent in the model is the FI. It collects deposits from the households at a risk-free
rate and lends them to the ﬁrm as a business loan. Because I assume a competitive FI market,
the FI’s expected proﬁt is zero.9 As to the ﬁnancial contract between the FI and the ﬁrm, I
assume a standard one-period debt contract with default costs as in Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
and Hennessy and Whited (2007).10
8As Frank and Goyal (2008) describe, the aggregate leverage ratio is very stable over time. This fact justiﬁes the
assumption that there is no aggregate shock.
9Actually, because I focus on a stationary economy, the ex post FI’s proﬁt is also always equal to zero owing to
the law of large numbers.
10The assumption to limit the contract space to a one-period debt contract signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the model, and
the fact that the one-period debt contract is one of the most common ﬁnancial contracts in the real economy justiﬁes
the assumption. However, the assumption excludes the following more general contract forms from the contract space.
First, I exclude a dynamic lending contract under asymmetric information as in Quadrini (2004) and Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006). Second, I exclude one-period ﬁnancial contracts outside a debt contract. Gale and Hellwig (1985)
show that a debt contract would be optimal among general one-period contracts if information frictions between
lenders and borrowers and a monitoring cost (or a default cost) exist. Unfortunately, I cannot directly utilize their
result because the current model is a dynamic model with persistent idiosyncratic shocks whereas their model is a
static model.
62.1 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms producing ﬁnal goods using assets and labor. In every period, after
the ﬁrm produces ﬁnal goods, it has the following three choices: continue, exit, or default. There
is also a continuum of new entrants. In a stationary equilibrium, the distribution of the ﬁrms’
characteristics is “stationary” in the sense that their entry and exit oﬀset each other.
2.1.1 Technology, Labor Choice, and Proﬁt
The ﬁrm uses two inputs, assets, k, and labor, l, to produce consumption goods. As to its technol-
ogy, I assume a standard Cobb–Douglas production function:
y = zkαklαl,
where z is a productivity idiosyncratic to each ﬁrm. I assume diminishing returns to scale, αk+αl <
1, to make ﬁrm size matter.11 As a competitive consumption goods market is assumed, the price
level of the consumption goods is the same for all ﬁrms. When normalizing the price level to one,
the revenue (i.e., the price times the amount of sales) becomes just the amount of sales, zkαklαl.
Next, I formulate the optimal labor choice of the ﬁrm as a static problem. A salient empirical
regularity about the labor choice is that the autocorrelation process of labor is much more persistent
than that of proﬁt and leverage. One interpretation is that productivity shocks that aﬀect the labor
choice are more persistent than those that aﬀect the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and leverage. In order to replicate
those processes, I make the following two assumptions. First, I assume that the idiosyncratic
productivity consists of two parts: a persistent component, zp, and a transitory component, η:
z ≡ zp · η.
The persistent productivity follows the AR(1) process after log-transformation:
log(z′
p) = ρlog(zp) + ϵ,where ϵ ∼ N(µϵ,σϵ), (1)
whereas the transitory component is independent and identically distributed (IID) and follows a
normal distribution after log-transformation:
log(η) ∼ N(0,ση).
Then, the next period’s labor choice becomes independent of the current period’s transitory pro-
ductivity shock, η, because it does not aﬀect the next period’s productivity. Second, I assume that
the ﬁrm chooses the current period’s labor after the realization of the persistent productivity, zp,
but before the realization of the transitory productivity, η. Then, the current period’s labor choice
11If the technology involves constant returns to scale and there is heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ productivity, it would be
eﬃcient that the ﬁrm with the highest productivity uses all assets and labor, and the ﬁrm size distribution would be
degenerate.
7is also independent of η. As a result of these two assumptions, the ﬁrm’s labor process is aﬀected
only by the process of the persistent productivity shock, zp, whereas the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and leverage
choice are aﬀected by both the persistent and transitory productivity shocks, zp and η. Therefore,
the process of labor becomes more persistent than that of proﬁt and leverage.12
Let l∗ be the optimal level of labor:
l∗(k;zp,w) = argmaxl
n




where w is a wage rate. Note that zpkαklαl is the expected revenue of the ﬁrm at the moment it
chooses the level of labor input because E[η] = 1 and Cov(zp,η) = 0.
Given the optimal choice of labor, l∗(k;zp,w), I deﬁne the ﬁrm’s proﬁt before an interest
payment, a tax payment, and depreciation (so called EBITDA) as follows:
π(k;z,w) = zkαkl∗αl − wl∗ − cf |{z}
fixed cost
. (3)
I assume that the ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed cost, cf, in every period as in Hopenhayn (1992). The
ﬁxed cost has two roles in the model. First, it induces economies of scale, which are observed
in the real economy. Without the ﬁxed cost, the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability measured by ROA would be
almost independent of its size (that is, there would be no economies of scale), because productive
ﬁrms become large (i.e., increase the denominator) and proﬁtable (i.e., increase the numerator)
simultaneously. Second, it gives unproductive ﬁrms an incentive to shut down their business and
exit from the economy. Without the ﬁxed cost, no ﬁrms would have an incentive to exit from the
economy because the lower bound of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt would be zero.
2.1.2 Evolution of the Firm’s Balance Sheet
Figure 1 represents a ﬁrm’s balance sheet at the beginning of the period, where k represents physical
assets and n is the amount of equity at the beginning of the period. When the amount of assets is
more than that of equity, i.e., k − n > 0, then k − n is the amount of debt. The ﬁrm signs a debt
contract, which is deﬁned as a combination of the amount of debt and the interest rate assigned on
the debt (k − n,r), with the FI. The ﬁrm pays interests to the FI and dividends to the household.
When the amount of assets is less than that of equity, i.e., k−n < 0, then k−n is the ﬁrm’s deposit
at the FI. In this case, I assume that the return of the ﬁrm’s deposit is equal to the risk-free rate,
rf.13
12This idea is based on the identiﬁcation strategy in Gourio (2008). In the quantitative part of this paper, I
calibrate the parameters of the two productivity processes so that the model replicates the diﬀerence in persistency
between the labor process and the leverage process.
13Under this setting, the ﬁrm cannot have both debt and deposits simultaneously. As most ﬁrms have both of
these in the real economy, it would be an interesting extension of the model to allow it.
8Figure 1: Balance Sheet at the Beginning of the Period
Given the ﬁrm’s EBITDA, which is denoted by π(k;z,w) in (3), the ﬁrm’s equity at the end of
the period, e(k,n;z,r,w), is determined as follows:
e(k,n;z,r,w) = (1 − τc)
h
π(k;z,w) − δk − r(k − n)
i
+ n, (4)
where δ is the depreciation rate of the physical assets and τc is the corporate income tax rate.
Intuitively, Equation (4) says that the equity at the end of the period is the sum of the ﬁrm’s
equity at the beginning of the period, n, plus its current proﬁt, (1−τc)[π(k;z,w) − δk − r(k − n)].
An important point here is that the corporate income tax system gives the ﬁrm a big incentive
to use debt rather than equity due to the tax deductibility of interest payments. That is, the tax
system enables the ﬁrm to decrease its corporate income tax payment by using more debt, (k−n),
because the corporate income tax is levied on the ﬁrm’s income after the interest payments. The
beneﬁt of using debt is called the “tax beneﬁt” in the capital structure literature.
2.1.3 Dynamic Optimization
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the ﬁrm’s decision. Given the amount of equity at the end of
the period, e(k,n;z,r,w), the ﬁrm solves two dynamic optimization problems. The ﬁrst one is
the continue/exit/default decision and the second one is an investment decision. In the rest of this
subsection, I ﬁrst deﬁne the dividend in this model, and then explain the two dynamic optimization
problems step by step.





(1 − τd)[e(k,n;z,r) − (1 − τc)g(k′,k) − n′], d ≥ 0
(1 + λ)[e(k,n;z,r) − (1 − τc)g(k′,k) − n′], d < 0,
(5)
9Figure 2: Timing of the Firm’s Decision
where k′ and n′ are assets and equity in the next period, respectively. g(k′,k) is a downward
adjustment cost, which the ﬁrm has to pay when it decreases the amount of assets from k to k′:
g(k′,k) = max{ξ((1 − δ)k − k′),0} where 0 ≤ ξ < 1.
This type of adjustment cost is often called a partial investment irreversibility and it is included
in many corporate ﬁnance and macroeconomics papers, including Abel and Eberly (1994) and
Veracierto (2002). The above deﬁnition of the ﬁrm’s dividend says that the dividend, d, is deﬁned
as what the ﬁrm owns at the end of the period, e(k,n;z,r), minus what the ﬁrm keeps for the
next period as its equity, n′, and the adjustment cost, (1 − τc)g(k′,k). That is, the dividend is
determined as a residual when the ﬁrm chooses its investment and ﬁnancing sources, i.e., it chooses
k′ and n′. When the amount of the dividend is positive, the ﬁrm has to pay the dividend tax. Its
tax rate is denoted by τd. On the other hand, when it is negative, it means that the amount of
outside equity ﬁnance is positive. In this case, the ﬁrm has to pay a proportional ﬂotation cost of
equity, λ.14
Exit Decision
As Figure 2 describes, after its proﬁt is determined, the ﬁrm has three choices: continue, exit, or
14The ﬂotation cost of equity can be interpreted as the fees paid to securities companies, the cost of asymmetric
information, and so forth.
10default. The discrete choice problem is formulated as follows:












where v(e,k;zp) is the ﬁrm’s value when it decides to continue doing business. When the ﬁrm
chooses to exit, it would sell all of its assets and payout d(0,0;e,k), the dividend when k′ = n′ = 0.
This means that the ﬁrm distributes the rest of the money to households after it pays back all of
its debt to the FI. When the ﬁrm chooses to default on its loan, it gets nothing, but does not have
to pay anything due to the limited liability assumption. Therefore, if the ﬁrm’s liquidation value
is lower than the amount of debt, the ﬁrm would choose to default rather than exit. I will explain
the response of the FI towards the defaulting ﬁrms in the next section.
Let h(e,k;zp) be the policy function of the discrete decision problem above. h(e,k;zp) = 1 if
the ﬁrm continues doing business, h(e,k;zp) = 2 if the ﬁrm exits, and h(e,k;zp) = 3 if the ﬁrm
defaults on its loan.
I assume that the ﬁrm that has chosen to continue doing business in the above endogenous
exit/continue decision is hit by an exogenous exit shock with probability χ. When the ﬁrm is hit
by the exogenous exit shock, it must exit.15 Given the exogenous exit shock, the value function
v(e,k;zp) is deﬁned as follows:
v(e,k;zp) = (1 − χ) · ˜ v(e,k;zp) + χ · d(0,0;e,k),
where ˜ v(e,k;zp) is the value of the ﬁrm given that it continues doing business.
Investment and Financing Decision
The second maximization problem for the ﬁrm is the investment and ﬁnancing decision. The ﬁrm
faces this second problem only when it chooses to continue doing business and it is not hit by
the exogenous exit shock. In this second problem, the ﬁrm simultaneously chooses the size of its
balance sheet (i.e., the amount of assets, k′) and its capital structure (i.e., the amount of equity,
n′) for the next period. The ﬁrm signs a one-period debt contract (k′ − n′,r′) with the FI to use
debt ﬁnancing. The value function, ˜ v(e,k;zp), is deﬁned as follows:









s.t. FI’s zero proﬁt condition,
where d(k′,n′;e,k) is the amount of dividends, which is deﬁned by (5), and β is a discount factor.
Note that I formulate the contractual problem as if the ﬁrm chooses the lending rate in a debt
15This shock is introduced in order to capture the fact that large ﬁrms as well as small ﬁrms also exit. Without the
exogenous exit shock, only small ﬁrms would exit from the economy in the model, because ﬁrm size and proﬁtability
are strongly correlated and proﬁtability is the only reason to exit in the model. The exogenous exit is also supposed
to capture the fact that some ﬁrms exit for exogenous reasons (scandals, disasters, no successors, and so on) in the
real economy.
11contract, r′, subject to the FI’s zero proﬁt condition (i.e., an individual rationality condition for the
FI). The dividend is determined as a residual when the ﬁrm chooses k′ and n′ given e,k, and zp. The
future value of the ﬁrm in this problem is ˆ v(e,k;zp), the ﬁrm value before the continue/exit/default
decision, because the maximization problem in the next period starts with the discrete choice again.
In this maximization problem, I assume that the ﬁrm must choose the asset size and capital
structure so that the liquidation value of the asset plus its deposit must be more than the sum of
the ﬁxed cost, cf, and the corporate income tax. That is, I assume that:
(1 − ξ)(1 − δ)k′ > cf + corporate income tax, (7)
where ξ is a downward adjustment const. This assumption prevents ﬁrms having a “wait and see”
attitude. Without this assumption, unproductive ﬁrms would wait one period without producing
anything in order to see their productivity in the next period rather than immediately exit, and
then the ﬁrm distribution would have a strange shape.16
2.1.4 New Entrants
I assume that the potential entrants enter the economy by paying an entry cost, ce. Their initial




v(0,0;zp)dζ(zp) ≥ ce. (8)
That is, they enter if the expected value of entry is higher than the entry cost. When the mass of
entrants is positive, this condition should be satisﬁed with equality. Otherwise, an inﬁnite number
of entrants would enter the economy.
2.2 Financial Intermediary
I assume a competitive market for FIs. By doing so, the FI in the model can be reduced to the
following zero proﬁt condition:



















· (1 + r′)(k′ − n′)
#
. (9)
16The ﬁrm prefers such an attitude because it does not have to pay anything, including the ﬁxed cost and the
corporate income tax, when the ﬁrm declares a default. The ﬁrm pays little cost for waiting one period compared
with its option value to wait. This assumption is a technical one, but it can be interpreted as follows. The ﬁrm would
not be trusted by business partners and would not be able to continue doing business unless it has enough physical
assets to cover at least the ﬁxed cost and the corporate income tax.
12The FI’s zero proﬁt condition in the model is relevant to the real economy because the ﬁrm solves
the contract problem (6) subject to the condition.17
The left-hand side of the equation is the FI’s funding cost. The FI receives deposits from
the households at the risk-free rate, rf. The right-hand side of the equation is the FI’s expected
earnings from the debt contract (k′−n′,r′). Π(η′) is a cdf of the transitory productivity shocks, η′.
x(z′
p) is a default threshold of η′. That is, when the persistent productivity level is equal to z′
p, the
ﬁrm chooses to default if and only if the transitory productivity shock, η′, is lower than x(z′
p).18
The threshold is implicitly deﬁned by:
max{v(e(k,n;x · zp,r),k;zp) , d(0,0;e(k,n;x · zp,r),k)} = 0.
The ﬁrst and second lines of the right-hand side of Equation (9) represent the case of default. In
the case of default, the FI ﬁrst takes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and assets, π(k′;z′,w′)+(1−δ)k′. Next, the
FI has to pay a default cost, which is proportional to the amount of the assets, γ(1 − δ)k. Finally,
the FI has two options about the defaulting ﬁrm’s future: provide the minimum ﬁnancial support
(i.e., debt forgiveness), b(k;zp), in order for the ﬁrm to remain a going concern, or liquidate the
ﬁrm by paying a liquidation cost, g(0,k).
Intuitively, the ﬁrst and second choices for the defaulting ﬁrm correspond to Chapters 11 and
7, respectively. When the FI chooses the ﬁrst option (i.e., Chapter 11), the amount of the ﬁnancial
support, which is denoted by b(k;zp), is implicitly determined by the value function of the ﬁrm
before the exogenous exit, v(e,k,zp), as follows:
v(b(k;zp),k;zp) = 0.
This means that the FI gives b(k;zp) back to the defaulting ﬁrm so that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between defaulting on the loan and continuing to do business. On the other hand, when the FI
chooses the second option (i.e., Chapter 7), it has to pay a liquidation cost, g(0,k), which is the
downward adjustment cost to decrease the amount of the ﬁrm’s assets to zero. The FI selects either
of the two options by comparing the cost of each option, b(k;zp) and g(0,k).
The FI’s decision regarding the future of the defaulting ﬁrm depends on zp and k in general,
but under reasonable parameter values, the FI keeps the ﬁrm as a going concern (i.e., it chooses
Chapter 11) in most cases in the model. The reason is that the ﬁrm voluntarily exits if it expects to
default and it exits in the next period with high probability because the ﬁrm and the FI can reduce
the default cost, γ. The FI chooses to liquidate the defaulting ﬁrm only when b(k′;z′
p) unexpectedly
reaches a high value due to a drastic decrease in productivity, z′
p.
17Under standard parameter values, the proﬁt for the ﬁrm and the FI move in opposite directions with respect to
the interest rate. Therefore, the zero proﬁt condition is always binding when the ﬁrm optimally solves the contract
problem.
18As both v(e(k,n;z,r),k;zp) and d(0,0;e(k,n;z,r),k) are increasing functions with respect to η, the ﬁrm adopts
such a threshold policy rule.
13The third line of the right-hand side of the equation represents the case where the ﬁrm pays
back the loan and the interest as promised in the debt contract. It contains the following two
choices for the ﬁrm: to continue running the business or to exit from the economy. Note that the
ﬁrm has to pay back all of its debt in both cases. The expected return in this case is equal to
[1 − Π(x(z′
p))] · (1 + r′)(k′ − n′) because its probability is [1 − Π(x(z′
p))].
2.3 Household
I assume a representative household. It supplies the labor force, Ls
t, to the ﬁrm and obtains wages,
wtLs
t. In addition, because the household owns all ﬁrms in the economy as a stockholder, it also
obtains the aggregate dividend, Dt, as another source of its income. The household allocates the
incomes to consumption, Ct, and savings at the FI, St, at the risk-free rate, rf. The household
faces the budget constraint:
Ct + St+1 = [1 + rf(1 − τi)]St + Dt + wtLs
t + Tt, (10)
where τi is the interest income tax rate and Tt is a lump sum transfer from the government. The
household maximizes its lifetime utility by consumption and labor supply. I assume log-utility
for consumption and linear disutility for labor supply as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and









subject to (10). β is a discount factor. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Ls







1 + rf(1 − τi)
Ct+1
. (12)
In the quantitative part of this paper, I will focus only on the stationary equilibrium. As all




= A and β =
1
1 + rf(1 − τi)
, (13)
and the budget constraint is:
C = rf(1 − τi)S + D + wLs + T. (14)
Under this budget constraint, D and T are exogenously given to the household. Then, given these
two values and the wage, w, the household chooses C, S, and Ls. I will use the ﬁrst-order conditions
and the budget constraint to compute a stationary equilibrium.19
19In the above formulation of the household problem, the household obtains the aggregate dividend and does not
choose the amount of the shares. Alternatively, I can formulate the household problem so that the household chooses
142.4 Aggregation and Market Clearing Conditions
Now that I have completed the description of the individual ﬁrm behavior and the household deci-
sion, I aggregate all ﬁrms and characterize a stationary equilibrium. In the stationary equilibrium,
because all prices and aggregate variables are constant by deﬁnition, they are dropped from the
list of state variables. Then, each ﬁrm can be speciﬁed by the following three variables, (e,k,zp):
the amount of equity, the amount of assets, and the level of persistent productivity. Let µ(e,k,zp)














p)} · I{k′=k∗(e,k;zp)} · (1 − s2(k∗;z′
p))
)








p)} · (1 − s3(z′
p))dζ(z′
p), (15)
where I is an indicator function that I = 1 if the inside of the brace is true. k∗ and n∗ are the ﬁrm’s
optimal policy functions for assets and equity at the state (e,k,zp). s1(e,k′;z′
p) and s2(k′;z′
p) are
indicator functions that are equal to one when the ﬁrm at state (e,k′;z′
p) chooses to exit in the case
of default and no default, respectively. Similarly, s3(z′
p) is equal to one when the entrant chooses
not to enter the economy. e∗(n∗,k∗,η · z′
p) is the amount of equity at the end of the period when
the ﬁrm optimally chooses the amount of assets, k∗, and the amount of equity, n∗. The ﬁrst line
of the inside of the integral represents the case of default and the second line represents the case
of no default. The last term on the right-hand side represents new entrants. M is the mass of new
entrants. Note that the amounts of equity and assets for the new entrants are zero. A stationary
distribution is a distribution µ∗ satisfying µt+1 = µt = µ∗. Practically, it is derived by repeatedly
applying the above law of motion to an arbitrary distribution until the distribution converges to
the stationary distribution.
Once we derive the stationary distribution, µ∗, the aggregate asset, equity, labor demand, and
the amount of shares in every period. As the household’s behavior in the alternative formulation eventually gives
the same allocation in a stationary equilibrium, the diﬀerence between the two formulations does not matter for the
quantitative results. However, by explicitly formulating the endogenous choice regarding the shares by the household,
the following two things can be derived as a result of the household’s optimization. First, the return on equity is
equal to the risk-free rate, 1 + rf(1 − τi), in equilibrium. While this sounds a little strange because it means that
an equity premium is equal to zero, it is a natural consequence of the household’s optimal portfolio choice without
aggregate uncertainty. Second, the discount rate, β, for the household is equal to that for the ﬁrm. In general,
the ﬁrm’s discount rate should be stochastic because it depends on the household consumption level. However, in
this paper, because I assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty and focus just on a stationary equilibrium, the
discount factor for the ﬁrm becomes constant and equal to β.
15output is deﬁned as follows:
Asset : K =
Z
k∗(e,k;zp)µ(e,k;zp)dedkdzp, (16)
Equity : N =
Z
n∗(e,k;zp)µ(e,k;zp)dedkdzp, (17)
Dividend : D =
Z
d(k∗(e,k;zp),n∗(e,k;zp);e,k)µ(e,k;zp)dedkdzp, (18)

















In addition, the aggregate adjustment cost caused by frictions is as follows:


























The ﬁrst line is the downward adjustment cost of assets. The second line is the liquidation cost for
exiting ﬁrms. The third line is the ﬂotation cost of equity and the fourth line is the default cost.
All costs are aggregated using the stationary distribution and assumed to be thrown away into the
sea. The last aggregate variable is the tax revenue:
Tax Revenue : T =
Z
τc · (π(k∗;ηz′






τd · I{d(k∗,n∗;e,k)>0} · d(k∗(e,k;zp),n∗(e,k;zp);e,k)µ(e,k,z)dedkdz
+
Z
τi · rf · (K − N)µ(e,k;zp)dedkdz. (22)
The ﬁrst, second, and third lines represent the corporate income tax, the dividend tax, and the
interest income tax, respectively.
Next, I characterize the market clearing conditions for the following three markets: labor,
consumption goods, and savings. First, the market clearing condition for the savings market is:
S = K − N. (23)
16The left-hand side is the savings by the representative household and the right-hand side is the
aggregate debt owned by ﬁrms. This equation means that all savings are used as debt in the ﬁrm’s
balance sheet. Next, the market clearing condition for the labor market is:
Ls = Ld. (24)
Finally, the market clearing condition for the consumption goods market is:
C = Y − δK − G. (25)
This condition says that the aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate output minus the
depreciation of assets and the adjustment costs. Note that δK is equal to the amount of investment
in the stationary equilibrium, and then the gross domestic product (GDP) is:
GDP = C + δK.
2.5 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
I close the model by characterizing a stationary competitive equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of (i) allocation rules for labor, saving,
and consumption for the household, Ls(D,T;w), S(D,T;w), and C(D,T;w), (ii) allocation rules
for labor, assets, and equity for each ﬁrm, l∗(k;zp,w), k∗(e,k;zp,w), and n∗(e,k;zp,w), (iii) a con-
tinue/exit/default decision for each ﬁrm, h(e,k;zp), (iv) value functions for each ﬁrm, ˆ v(e,k;zp),
v(e,k;zp), and ˜ v(e,k;zp), (v) aggregate variables, K,N,Ld,D, Y,G, and T, (vi) a wage rate, w,
and a lending rate, r, and (vii) a stationary distribution, µ∗(e,k,zp), and the mass of entrants, M,
such that the following apply.
1. The household decision rules satisfy its FOCs and the budget constraint.
2. The ﬁrm’s decision rules, a lending rate, and value functions solve the maximization problems
for each ﬁrm.
3. The market clearing conditions are satisﬁed.
4. The free entry condition is satisﬁed.
5. The aggregation rules (i.e., consistency) are satisﬁed.
6. The stationary distribution, µ∗, satisﬁes the law of motion with µt+1 = µt = µ∗.
17Table 1: Calibration 1
Parameters Values
Discount rate, β 0.966 Risk-free rate = 0.04
Labor disutility, A 1.28 Labor supply = 0.6
Return to scale, αk + αl 0.85 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)
Technology, αk 0.25 Investment/Output = 0.16
Depreciation, δ 0.078 Capital/Output = 2.0
Scrapping cost, ξ 0.41 Hennessy and Whited (2005)
Equity funding cost, λ 0.059 Hennessy and Whited (2005)
Default cost, γ 0.07 Estimate by World Bank
Exogenous exit rate, χ 0.02 Exit rate for large ﬁrms
3 Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, I compute a stationary competitive equilibrium. To begin with, I calibrate the
model based on the US data. After the calibration, I numerically compute a stationary equilibrium,
and then investigate the corporate capital structure choice in the stationary equilibrium using the
following two steps. First, I describe the dispersion of leverage in the model and compare it with
the data. Second, I explore the relationship between leverage, ﬁrm size, and proﬁtability. I conduct
some regressions using both real economic data and artiﬁcial data generated from the stationary
distribution, and compare the regression results.
The algorithm to compute a stationary equilibrium is based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
and it is summarized in Appendix A. As for the data source, I use COMPUSTAT in this paper.
See Appendix C for more detail about the data and deﬁnitions of variables.
3.1 Calibration
I set one period in the model to one year, and then I set the risk-free rate, rf, to 4%.20 By the
Euler equation of the household, the discount rate for the household, β, is equal to 1/(1+rf(1−τi))
because I focus solely on a stationary equilibrium. In the baseline model, the wage, w, is set to
1.0 and the labor disutility parameter, A, is chosen so that an equilibrium labor supply is equal to
0.6, which is the average employment rate in the US, as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). For
technology parameters, I set the degree of diminishing returns, αk + αl, to 0.85 as in Veracierto
(2002) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). Then, I choose αk so that the aggregate investment–output
20This rate is a little higher than the risk-free rate in the real economy but because there is no aggregate uncertainty
and the equity premium is equal to zero in this model, this return is interpreted as a more general return in the
economy.
18Table 2: Calibration 2
Parameters Calibration target
Fixed cost, cf Total exit rate = 0.07
The persistent productivity shocks, zp
AR(1) parameter, ρ Autocorrelation of employee size
Mean , µϵ/1 − ρ Average employee size
Standard deviation, σϵ Std. of residuals in employment process
Std. of the transitory shocks, ση Autocorrelation of leverage
New entrant’s distribution, ζ(zp)
Mean Unconditional mean of zp
Standard deviation Entrants’ size distribution
ratio is equal to 16%. αk = 0.25 gives the target value of the aggregate investment–output ratio,
and then αl = 0.85−0.25 = 0.6. Finally, I set δ = 0.078 so that the aggregate capital–output ratio
in the stationary equilibrium is equal to 2.0. The target investment–output ratio and the target
capital–output ratio are taken from NIPA data for the last 15 years in the US.
Next, I calibrate the friction parameters, which are relatively speciﬁc to this model. First,
I set the ﬂotation cost of equity and the downward adjustment cost of assets to λ = 0.059 and
ξ(1 − τc) = 0.41 according to Hennessy and Whited (2005). I choose the default cost, γ = 0.07,
according to the “Doing Business” database at the World Bank, which states that the default cost
in the US is about 7% of a defaulting ﬁrm’s estate value. I set the exogenous exit rate, χ, to
2%, which is the exit rate for ﬁrms with more than 150,000 employees in COMPUSTAT because
the exogenous exit is introduced to capture the fact that some large ﬁrms choose to exit. Given
this exogenous exit rate, I calibrate the ﬁxed cost, cf, so that the total exit rate, including the
exogenous one, is equal to 7%, which is the total exit rate calculated by COMPUSTAT in the last
ﬁve years.21 The parameters up to this point are summarized in Table 1.
For the stochastic processes of productivity, the unconditional mean of the persistent produc-
tivity shock, µϵ, is ﬁrst chosen so that the average ﬁrm size measured by the number of employees
matches that in COMPUSTAT. I can use ﬁrm size as a calibration target because ﬁrm size and
productivity are strongly correlated. Next, I calibrate the AR(1) parameter ρ and the standard
deviation σϵ so that the autocorrelation of the labor process and the standard deviation of residuals
21It may be observed that this is lower than the exit rate computed by the US Census data, which is around
9%. This diﬀerence stems from the fact that COMPUSTAT consists of relatively high performing ﬁrms because this
database contains only listed ﬁrms in the US. I assume that ﬁrms exit from the economy at period t if they existed
in period t−1, but they do not exist in period t. Of course, they disappear from the database for other reasons such
as mergers or no longer listing, but I think that the value is a rough proxy for the exit rate.
19Table 3: Tax Rates
Parameters Values
Corporate incomes, τc
Current proﬁt > 0, τ
h
c 0.35




Interest incomes, τi 0.296
in the autocorrelation process of labor match those in COMPUSTAT.22 I can use the autocorrela-
tion process of labor as a calibration target because the ﬁrm’s labor choice is aﬀected only by the
persistent productivity and is independent of the transitory productivity in the model. According
to the procedure, I choose ρ = 0.97 and σϵ = 0.115.
For the transitory productivity shocks, because the ﬁrm’s leverage is aﬀected by both persistent
and transitory productivity in this model, I set the standard deviation of transitory productivity,
ση, so that the model accounts for the autocorrelation process of leverage. Given the parameter
values for the persistent productivity process, ση = 0.35 makes the model’s leverage process match
closely to the data.23
For the productivity distribution of entrants, ζ(zp), I assume that the distribution is the normal
distribution. Then, the parameters to be speciﬁed are the mean and variance of the distribution.
First, I set the mean of the entrant’s productivity distribution to the unconditional mean of pro-
ductivity, µϵ/1 − ρ, as in Gomes (2001). Given this value of the mean, I calibrate the variance
of the entrant’s productivity distribution so that the size distribution of entrants matches that in
COMPUSTAT. The calibration targets of parameter values up to this point are summarized in
Table 2.
For the tax rates in the model, I set the dividend tax rate, τd, and the interest income tax
rate, τi, to 12% and 29.6%, respectively, based on Graham (2000). In addition, I set the corporate
income tax rate, τh
c , to 35% for ﬁrms with positive proﬁts based on Graham (2000). However,
on the other hand, I set the corporate income tax rate for ﬁrms with negative proﬁt, τl
c, to 20%
because the corporate income tax system in many countries adopts a progressive tax rate system.24
This corporate income tax system is still simple compared with the tax system in the real economy,
but it captures the progressivity in the corporate income tax system and aﬀects the quantitative
22This calibration strategy is the same as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) except that they use establishment
data rather than ﬁrm data.
23The autocorrelation and the standard deviation of residuals are 0.83 and 0.14 in the data and 0.83 and 0.15 in
the model.
24I choose a nonzero value for τ
l
c because the loss in the current period will be deducted from the future taxable
income. Thus, I set the corporate income tax rate for exiting ﬁrms with negative proﬁts to zero.
20Figure 3: Histogram of Leverage
















Note: The ﬁgure shows the histograms of ﬁrms’ leverage in COMPUSTAT and in the model. It shows that the
stationary distribution in the model accounts for the fact that (1) more than 30% of ﬁrms are almost-zero leverage
ﬁrms, and (2) leverage of nonzero leverage ﬁrms diﬀers considerably from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. The simple average of
leverage is 0.29 in COMPUSTAT and it is 0.29 in the model.
results in the model. The tax rates used in the model are summarized in Table 3.
3.2 Result 1: Distribution of Leverage
Figure 3 illustrates the histograms of ﬁrms’ leverage in the data and in the model. The stationary
distribution in the model accounts for the fact that (1) more than 30% of ﬁrms are almost-zero
leverage ﬁrms, and (2) leverage of nonzero leverage ﬁrms diﬀers considerably from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. As
I do not use cross-sectional moments of leverage as calibration targets, I conclude that the model
captures the mechanism to generate the dispersion of leverage fairly well.
3.3 Result 2: Relationship between Leverage, Firm Size, and Proﬁtability
Next, I investigate the empirical relationship between leverage, ﬁrm size, and proﬁtability. I conduct
several regressions using artiﬁcial data generated from the stationary distribution, and compare the
estimation results with the estimations using the real economic data.
I estimate the following reduced form equations, which are familiar in empirical corporate
21ﬁnance papers such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002):
Leveragei = β0 + β1 log(Employeei) + ϵi, (26)
Leveragei = β0 + β1ROAi + ϵi, (27)
Leveragei = β0 + β1ROAi + β2 log(Employeei) + ϵi, (28)
where i represents an individual ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst (second) equation, I estimate a simple relationship
between leverage and ﬁrm size (proﬁtability). The number of employees and ROA are proxies for
ﬁrm size and proﬁtability, respectively. In the last equation, I estimate a marginal eﬀect of ﬁrm size
and proﬁtability on leverage after controlling for the other variable. As econometricians usually
control for many variables to measure a marginal eﬀect, the last equation is the most familiar
equation in empirical corporate ﬁnance literature.
Estimation Using Real Data
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation using the real economic data. First, it shows that the
simple correlation between leverage and ﬁrm size is positive. Second, it shows that the simple corre-
lation between leverage and proﬁtability is also positive. This positive correlation between leverage
and proﬁtability may be a little surprising because previous empirical papers do not focus on such
a simple correlation. Third, it shows that the coeﬃcient on ROA turns out to be negative when I
limit the data to ﬁrms larger than the average. This result is consistent with Rajan and Zingales
(1995), who point out that the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability tends to be negative
as ﬁrm size becomes large. Finally, the estimation shows that when I estimate the relationships of
leverage with ﬁrm size and proﬁtability simultaneously, the coeﬃcient on proﬁtability is negative.
Many academic researchers have tried to theoretically explain the negative relationship between
leverage and proﬁtability after controlling for other characteristics of ﬁrms because the negative
relationship is diﬃcult to be justiﬁed on the grounds of the trade-oﬀ between the tax beneﬁt and
the ﬁnancial distress cost.
Estimation Using the Model Output
Next, I estimate equations (26)–(28) using the model output by conducting the following two
steps. First, I randomly draw artiﬁcial data from the equilibrium stationary distribution. Second,
I conduct the regressions using the artiﬁcial data. This procedure is the same as in Gomes (2001).
Table 4 shows the estimation results using the artiﬁcial data generated from the stationary
distribution. It shows that while the magnitudes of coeﬃcients are slightly diﬀerent from those in
the estimation using the real economic data, the artiﬁcial data from the model accounts for the sign
of the relationship between leverage, ﬁrm size, and proﬁtability. The coeﬃcient on ﬁrm size and
proﬁtability is positive when I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and those variables,
but the coeﬃcient on proﬁtability turns out to be negative once I limit the data to large ﬁrms or
once I control for ﬁrm size.
22Table 4: Estimation Results
Data
Variable Book Leverage
log(Employee) 0.026 – (Large ﬁrms only) 0.030
[0.025 0.027] [0.029 0.031]
ROA – 0.068 -0.334 -0.066
[0.059 0.077] [-0.356 -0.312] [-0.076 -0.057]
adj. R2 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.16
Obs. 53,874 50,642 29,981 50,642
Model
Variable Book Leverage
log(Employee) 0.019 – (Large ﬁrms only) 0.021
[0.017 0.021] [0.019 0.024]
ROA – 0.024 -0.109 -0.037
[0.013 0.036] [-0.137 -0.082] [-0.050 -0.024]
Note: I conduct the estimate using ordinary least squares. The contents of the brackets show the 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals. For the real economic data, I use the pooling panel data of COMPUSTAT from the last 20 years.
See Appendix C for more detail. I drop observations as outliers if their ROA is more than the upper 3% tile or
less than the lower 3% tile in both the data and the model output. “Large ﬁrms only” means that I drop the
observation from the dataset if the ﬁrm size is smaller than the average. When I conduct the estimate using the real
economic data, I add a time dummy for each year and an industry dummy based on SIC codes. When I conduct the
estimate using the model output, I randomly draw 50,000 samples from the stationary distribution, which is close
to the number of samples in the real economic data. The number of draws does not change the estimation results
signiﬁcantly.
23This estimation result is one of the main results of the paper. Some other structural models also
succeed in accounting for the negative relationship between leverage and proﬁtability, which has
been a big puzzle in the corporate ﬁnance literature. However, as far as I know, a structural model
to simultaneously account for the sign of the relationship between leverage, proﬁtability, and ﬁrm
size does not exist. In particular, while the size dependency of the relationship between leverage
and proﬁtability is pointed out by empirical works, its microfoundation has not been investigated
or even mentioned in previous theoretical papers.
3.4 The Logic Behind the Results
What is the logic behind the distribution of leverage and the relationship between leverage, ﬁrm
size, and proﬁtability? In this subsection, I ﬁrst describe a ﬁrm’s leverage behavior by looking at
an individual ﬁrm’s policy functions. Then, given the leverage behavior, I interpret the results that
I have obtained above.
3.4.1 The Firm’s Leverage Behavior
To investigate a ﬁrm’s leverage behavior, I separately show a ﬁrm’s optimal policy in relation to
its equity (the numerator) and assets (the denominator). I then describe the leverage behavior as
a combination of these two policy functions.
Figure 4 shows the policy function of equity, nt+1, with respect to the amount of equity at the
end of the previous period, et(= nt + πt). There are two notable features in this ﬁgure. First, it
shows that the optimal amount of equity is on the 45 degree line in most cases for both low and
high productivity ﬁrms. This behavior implies that the ﬁrm uses its internal funds as much as
possible for investment, and when the internal funds become insuﬃcient for the investment, the
ﬁrm ﬁlls its ﬁnancing deﬁcit (the gap between investment and the amount of internal funds) mainly
by debt. That is, the ﬁrm’s preference is:
Internal Fund ≽ Debt ≽ Outside Equity.
This behavior is known as the “pecking order” and it is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of
many papers.25 The pecking order behavior stems from the costs of outside equity such as the
ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend tax.26 While these costs obviously make ﬁrms prefer debt
to outside equity, they also make ﬁrms prefer internal funds to debt because the costs operate
as a form of ﬁnancial distress costs. That is, because the outside equity is one of the important
ﬁnancing sources for dealing with ﬁnancial distress, the costs associated with outside equity make
debt unattractive and give the ﬁrm an incentive to use its internal funds to prepare for future
25For example, see Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Leary and Roberts (2005).
26Stiglitz (1973) is the ﬁrst paper showing the costs of outside equity inducing the pecking order preference.
24ﬁnancial distress.27 Second, Figure 4 also shows that the ﬁrm uses the outside equity only if
its productivity is low and its internal funds are small.28 The equilibrium lending rates by ﬁrm
productivity in Figure 5 give an intuition behind this behavior.29 The ﬁgure shows that the lending
rate is increasing with respect to leverage particularly for a low productivity ﬁrm. Such a high
lending rate for a low productivity ﬁrm forces it to decrease its leverage by increasing the outside
equity up to the point where the ﬁrm can use debt at a reasonable lending rate.
Next, I describe a ﬁrm’s optimal behavior in regard to its asset size, kt+1. Figure 6 is a three-
dimensional graph showing the policy function for assets. It shows that the optimal size of assets
is monotonically increasing with respect to the ﬁrm’s productivity, but it is barely aﬀected by the
amount of internal funds, except in the case of ﬁrms with very low productivity.30 It implies that
the outside ﬁnancing constraint is relevant only to the investment decisions of very low productivity
ﬁrms and it is irrelevant to others.31
Given the policy function for equity, nt+1, and asset size, kt+1, I describe a ﬁrm’s leverage
behavior, (kt+1 − nt+1)/kt+1. Figure 7 shows the policy function of leverage. The ﬁgure has the
following two noticeable features, which have an implication about the relationship between leverage
and productivity.
The ﬁrst feature is that ﬁrms with high persistent productivity are more leveraged in equilibrium
(the solid line is above the dotted line). This implies:
Corr(zp,lev) > 0,
where “lev” is a ﬁrm’s leverage and zp is the persistent productivity. There are two reasons for the
relationship. The ﬁrst reason is that the optimal asset size (and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit, as a result)
of high productivity ﬁrms is large, and the ﬁnancing deﬁcit is usually ﬁlled by debt, according to
27This conservative behavior by ﬁrms in relation to debt ﬁnance seems to correspond to the criteria of “ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility” that CFOs of US ﬁrms nominate as one of the most important determinants of corporate capital structure
in the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001). That is, the behavior relates to the desire of ﬁrms to “remain ﬂexible in
the sense of minimizing interest obligations, so that they do not need to shrink their business in case of an economic
downturn.”
28Because ﬁrms with low productivity and low internal funds are usually small, less proﬁtable, and much less
leveraged, this behavior is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings by Leary and Roberts (2010), who argue that ﬁrms
issuing new outside equity in violation of the pecking order are small, less proﬁtable, and much less leveraged. See
also Frank and Goyal (2003) and Lemmon and Zender (2009) for similar results.
29It may be noticed that the level of credit spreads is small for all ﬁrms compared with the actual data. The tight
credit spreads in this model are not surprising, as I do not include aggregate uncertainty in this model. Papers such
as Chen (2010) and Gomes and Schmid (2010) argue that aggregate uncertainty is a key component accounting for
a plausible level of credit spread. Incorporating aggregate uncertainty to account for the level of credit spreads is an
interesting potential extension of this model.
30Note that there is an inaction area where the optimal amount of assets is ﬂat, which is common for a model with
investment irreversibility.
31This is consistent with the recent ﬁndings about the ﬁrm size distribution. Angelini and Generale (2008) use
Italian ﬁrm data and argue that ﬁnancial constraints are important for small ﬁrms, but play little role in determining
the ﬁrm size distribution as a whole.
25Figure 4: Policy Function of Equity





















































Figure 5: Policy Function of the Lending Rate



























































Figure 7: Policy Function of Leverage





























Note: Figure 4 shows the policy function of equity for the next period, nt+1, with respect to the amount of equity at
the end of the current period, et. The solid line is the policy function for a high productivity ﬁrm and the dotted one
is that for a low productivity ﬁrm. Figure 5 shows the equilibrium lending rates with respect to the ﬁrm’s leverage.
The horizontal axis is the ﬁrm’s leverage, and the dotted, dashed, and solid lines are the lending rates for the low,
middle, and high productivity ﬁrms, respectively. Figure 6 shows the three-dimensional policy function of assets,
kt+1. The x- and y-axes indicate the amount of equity at the end of period, et, and the productivity, zp,t. Figure 7
shows the policy function of leverage. The horizontal axis shows the amount of equity, et. Again, the solid line is
the policy function for a high productivity ﬁrm and the dotted one is that for a low productivity ﬁrm.
26the pecking order. The second reason is that debt is less accessible for low productivity ﬁrms than
it is for high productivity ﬁrms because of the high equilibrium lending rates for low productivity
ﬁrms, as shown in Figure 5.
The second feature is that the policy functions of leverage are decreasing with respect to the
amount of equity, et. The reason is as follows. When et increases, ﬁrms tend to use more internal
funds (i.e., equity), according to the pecking order, whereas they do not change the optimal size
of their assets, as is shown in Figure 6. This feature implies that the transitory productivity, η,
decreases a ﬁrm’s leverage because it just increases the ﬁrm’s internal funds through an increase in
its proﬁt, π. That is:
Corr(η,lev) < 0.
In the next subsection, I use the relationship between leverage and the two types of productivity
for interpreting the result that I have obtained.
3.4.2 Interpretation of the Results
First, given the behavior of leverage, I investigate the logic behind the stationary distribution
of leverage. In particular, I describe the logic behind the following two notable features of the
distribution.
The ﬁrst feature is that many ﬁrms, more than 30%, are almost-zero leverage ﬁrms. There are
two reasons for this. First, because the average ﬁrm proﬁt must be positive (otherwise, the ﬁrms
would choose to exit from the economy), the pecking order behavior implies that ﬁrms accumulate
their internal funds and as a result decrease their leverage as time goes on. Second, as some low
productivity ﬁrms cannot use debt due to high lending rates, they remain less leveraged.
The second feature is that the leverage of nonzero leverage ﬁrms considerably diﬀers from ﬁrm
to ﬁrm. Because I have already explained why some ﬁrms are less leveraged, I will explain why
some ﬁrms are highly leveraged. The logic is as follows. As the optimal asset size is barely aﬀected
by the amount of internal funds, as shown in Figure 6, ﬁrms with low internal funds increase their
assets just by adjusting the leverage. For example, if ﬁrms are suddenly hit by a good productivity
shock or if ﬁrms are too young to accumulate their internal funds, they would be highly leveraged.
Next, I describe the logic behind the second result: the relationship between leverage, ﬁrm size,
and proﬁtability. First, I explain why leverage and ﬁrm size are positively correlated. I claim that
this positive correlation is a combination of the two correlations. That is:
Corr(zp,lev) & Corr(zp,size) > 0 ⇒ Corr(lev,size) > 0,
where “lev” is a ﬁrm’s leverage and zp is the persistent productivity. I have already explained
the logic behind Corr(zp,lev) > 0. Also, I can establish easily that Corr(zp,size) > 0 because
the optimal ﬁrm size becomes almost proportional to the productivity according to a ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization. Figure 8 represents the stationary joint distribution of productivity and asset size.
The ﬁgure shows a clear positive relationship between them.
27Figure 8: Distribution of Productivity and Assets

























Note: This represents the stationary joint distribution of productivity and asset size. The horizontal axis shows the
amount of assets, k, in log-scale and the vertical axis shows the persistent part of productivities, zp. The ﬁgure
shows a clear positive relationship between them.
Next, I consider the logic behind the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability measured
by ROA. In the model, it could be either positive or negative. On the one hand, leverage and
proﬁtability could be positively correlated as the combination of the two positive correlations:
Corr(lev, size) > 0 & Corr(size, ROA) > 0 ⇒ Corr(lev, ROA) > 0.
I already explained the logic behind Corr(lev, size) > 0. I can establish Corr(size, ROA) > 0 by
the economies of scale, which emerges as a result of the ﬁxed cost, cf, in this model.32 Figures
9 and 10 are the joint distributions of ROA and the log of employment size in the data and the
model, respectively. Both ﬁgures show similar “economies of scale”, which seem to be caused by
the ﬁxed cost: ROAs of large ﬁrms are higher than those of small ﬁrms, but the larger the ﬁrm
size, the smaller the economies of scale.
On the other hand, a ﬁrm’s leverage and proﬁtability could be negatively correlated through
the transitory productivity, η:
Corr(lev,η) < 0 & Corr(η,ROA) > 0 ⇒ Corr(lev, ROA) < 0.
The logic behind Corr(lev,η) < 0 was explained in the previous subsection. The transitory pro-
ductivity, η, and ROA are positively correlated because the transitory productivity increases the
32Without the ﬁxed cost, the relationship between ROA and ﬁrm size would be ambiguous and almost uncorrelated,
because both the denominator and the numerator of ROA (i.e., ﬁrm size and EBITDA) would increase at the same
pace as the persistent productivity, zp, increases. With the ﬁxed cost, however, ROA and ﬁrm size are positively
correlated because the ﬁrm’s EBITDA would increase faster than its size as the persistent productivity increases.
28Figure 9: ROA and Employment Size (Data) Figure 10: ROA and Employment Size (Model)
Note: These ﬁgures are the joint distributions of ROA and the log of employment size in COMPUSTAT and the
model. Both ﬁgures show similar “economies of scale”, which seem to be caused by the ﬁxed cost: ROAs of large
ﬁrms are higher than those of small ﬁrms, but the larger the ﬁrm size, the smaller the economies of scale.
ﬁrm’s EBITDA (the numerator) but does not aﬀect the ﬁrm size (the denominator).
Because of the potential positive and negative correlations, the sign of correlation between
leverage and proﬁtability is ambiguous in general in this model. However, when I estimate the
simple correlation between leverage and proﬁtability, the positive correlation is dominant because
the persistent productivity aﬀects a ﬁrm’s behavior more than the transitory productivity. Then,
we obtain:
Corr(lev, ROA) > 0,
both in the data and the model.
However, when I limit the data to large ﬁrm data, ROA is almost independent of ﬁrm size
(i.e., no economies of scale) because the ﬁxed cost is less relevant to large ﬁrms. Therefore, only
the negative correlation between leverage and ROA through the transitory productivity remains.
Then, I obtain:
Corr(lev, ROA | Large ﬁrms only) < 0,
both in the data and the model.
Similarly, when I estimate the relationship between leverage, ﬁrm size, and ROA simultaneously,
the ﬁrm size absorbs the positive eﬀect of ROA on leverage. Therefore, ROA in this regression
captures only the negative eﬀect through the transitory productivity, and so the coeﬃcient on
proﬁtability turns out to be negative:
Corr(lev, ROA | size) < 0,
both in the data and the model.
29Table 5: Changes in Average and Aggregate Leverage
Corporate tax Corporate tax Flotation cost Default Capital Average Aggregate
(pos. proﬁt) (neg. proﬁt) & dividend tax cost adjustment leverage leverage
(τh
c ) (τl
c) (λ + τd) (γ) cost (ξ) ratio ratio
Baseline 0.35 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.34 0.29
0.28 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.33 0.26
0.28 0.20 0.0 0.07 0.41 0.00 0.00
0.35 0.20 0.0 0.07 0.41 0.23 0.51
Note: The bold letters represent the values that are diﬀerent from the baseline model. The average leverage ratio
means the simple average of ﬁrms’ leverage and the aggregate leverage ratio means the aggregate equity divided by
the aggregate debt plus equity in the new stationary equilibrium.
4 Counterfactual Experiment
What is the key determinant of corporate capital structure? This is a recurrent question in the
corporate ﬁnance literature. In this section, I try to answer the question through counterfactual
experiments in two parts. First, I explore what makes the ﬁrm use debt. To answer the question, I
drop the beneﬁts of using debt one by one, and see how the average and aggregate leverages would
change. Second, I explore what makes the ﬁrm use equity. To answer this question, I drop the
beneﬁts of using equity one by one. The procedure of the counterfactual experiment is given in
Appendix B.
4.1 What Makes Firms Use Debt?
What gives the ﬁrm an incentive to use debt? A natural guess is the tax beneﬁt generated by the
gap between the corporate income tax rate and the interest income tax rate. As the ﬁrst experiment,
I eliminate the tax beneﬁt by lowering the corporate income tax rate to 28%, which is lower than
the interest income tax rate, 29.6%, and recalculate the stationary equilibrium. The second row
of Table 5 shows the ﬁrm’s average and aggregate leverage in the new stationary equilibrium. It
shows that without the tax beneﬁt, the ﬁrm’s leverage would decrease a little, but the magnitude
of the change in leverage is very small. This result is actually in contrast to previous works. For
example, Hennessy and Whited (2005) state in their counterfactual experiment that:
When we lower the maximal corporate tax rate below the tax rate on interest income,
we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm always retains funds and only ﬁnances with equity.
This contrast stems from the assumption about ﬁrms’ entry/exit. Without ﬁrms’ entry/exit as a
standard dynamic trade-oﬀ model, all ﬁrms would eventually use 100% equity by accumulating
30Figure 11: Firm Age and Leverage























Note: The ﬁgure plots the fraction of entrants and ﬁrms older than 10 years in each category of leverage. It shows that
while the fraction of entrants increases as the leverage increases, the fraction of ﬁrms older than 10 years decreases
as the leverage increases.
internal funds, according to the pecking order, if the tax beneﬁt does not exist. However, with
ﬁrms’ entry/exit as in this paper, young ﬁrms always exist and use debt in the process of their
evolution because they prefer debt to outside equity.33 Figure 11 plots the fraction of entrants
and ﬁrms older than 10 years in each category of leverage. It shows that young ﬁrms tend to use
more debt. That is, while the fraction of entrants increases as the leverage increases, the fraction
of ﬁrms older than 10 years decreases as the leverage increases. For example, while half of zero
leveraged ﬁrms are ﬁrms older than 10 years, less than 5% of them are entrants. The result of the
ﬁrst counterfactual experiment is consistent with the fact that debt ﬁnance was a popular ﬁnancing
tool before the corporate income tax was introduced.
Next, as the second experiment, I eliminate the outside equity costs (the dividend tax and the
ﬂotation cost of equity) in addition to the tax beneﬁt. That is, I set λ + τd = 0 in addition to
τh
c = 28%.34 The third row of the table shows the result. The average and aggregate leverages in
equilibrium become zero because the ﬁrm has no incentive to use debt.
Do the results up to this point imply that the costs of outside equity such as the ﬂotation cost
of equity and the dividend tax are the main reasons to be leveraged? Unfortunately, it is not so
simple. As the third experiment, I set the costs of outside equity to zero, λ + τd = 0, but change
the corporate income tax rate back to τh
c = 35%. I obtain a somewhat puzzling result, as is shown
33This feature is not new to this paper, but many papers, including Cooley and Quadrini (2001), argue that young
ﬁrms use more debt than old ﬁrms.
34It is easy to show that the dividend tax and the ﬂotation cost of equity mathematically have the same eﬀect and
so the relevant value is just the sum of them, λ + τd.
31Table 6: Changes in Average and Aggregate Leverages
Corporate tax Corporate tax Flotation cost Default Capital Average Aggregate
(pos. proﬁt) (neg. proﬁt) & dividend tax cost adjustment leverage leverage
(τh
c ) (τl
c) (λ + τd) (γ) cost (ξ) ratio ratio
Baseline 0.35 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.34 0.29
0.35 0.20 0.179 0.0 0.41 0.61 0.39
0.35 0.35 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.50 0.46
0.35 0.35 0.179 0.0 0.41 0.75 0.62
0.35 0.35 0.0 0.0 0.41 0.91 0.99
0.35 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.21 0.48 0.44
Note: The bold letters represent the values that are diﬀerent from the baseline model. The average leverage ratio
refers to the simple average of ﬁrms’ leverage positions and the aggregate leverage ratio refers to the aggregate equity
divided by the aggregate debt plus equity in the new stationary equilibrium.
in the last row of Table 5: the average leverage decreases, but the aggregate leverage increases.
This means that small ﬁrms are less leveraged whereas large ﬁrms are more leveraged. The logic
behind the result is as follows. As I explained in Section 3.4.1, the costs of outside equity cause the
pecking order preference:
Internal Fund ≽ Debt ≽ Outside Equity.
Therefore, the costs of outside equity have an ambiguous eﬀect on leverage in general because
they encourage the ﬁrm to use more internal funds rather than debt, but they encourage the ﬁrm
to use debt rather than outside equity. However, their relative magnitude depends on the ﬁrm’s
productivity and age. The costs of outside equity tend to increase the leverage of productive and
well-established ﬁrms because the choice between internal funds and debt is more relevant for them.
On the other hand, those costs tend to decrease leverage for unproductive and new ﬁrms because
the choice between debt and outside equity is more relevant for them. As the large ﬁrms are usually
productive and well established, the costs of outside equity cause the diﬀerent responses between
the average and aggregate leverage in the experiment.
4.2 What Makes Firms Use Equity?
The second question in the experiment is why the ﬁrm uses equity rather than debt. To answer
this question, I drop the frictions that make the ﬁrm use equity from the model, and recalculate
the stationary equilibrium.
A natural guess is that ﬁrms use equity rather than debt because of the default cost, γ. It
makes debt unattractive because the equilibrium lending rate is determined by taking into account
32endogenous default and its cost. As the ﬁrst experiment, I set the default cost equal to zero, γ = 0.
The second row of Table 6 shows the result: when the default cost is eliminated, the ﬁrm’s leverage
is almost doubled (average: 34% → 61%). The result of the experiment shows that the default
cost is an important determinant of capital structure. It implies that it is not a good approach for
capital structure analysis to assume that a risk-free bond without default is the only choice of debt.
The tax system in this paper gives the tax disbeneﬁt to unproﬁtable ﬁrms because the corporate
income tax rate for them is lower than the interest income rate as a result of the progressive tax
rate system. As the second experiment, I increase the corporate tax rate for ﬁrms with negative
corporate income, τl
c, from 20% to 35%. By doing so, I eliminate the tax disbeneﬁt for unproﬁtable
ﬁrms. The third row of Table 6 shows that ﬁrms are more leveraged when the tax disbeneﬁt is
eliminated (average: 34% → 50%). This implies that the tax disbeneﬁt is also an important factor
making ﬁrms use equity.
Even when I eliminate both the default cost and the tax disbeneﬁt, the average leverage increases
to 75%. What else makes ﬁrms use equity? The answer is the costs of outside equity such as the
ﬂotation cost of equity and the dividend tax, λ+τd, which operate as types of ﬁnancial distress costs.
When I eliminate the costs of outside equity in addition to the default cost and the tax disbeneﬁt as
the next experiment, the average and aggregate leverage become almost equal to one.35 The results
up to this point show that a ﬁrm’s leverage would become close to one once the default cost, the
tax disbeneﬁt, and the costs of outside equity are eliminated. It is a little surprising because some
papers, including Hennessy and Whited (2005), emphasize investment irreversibility as a major
ﬁnancial distress cost. As the last experiment, I eliminate only the investment irreversibility. The
last row of Table 6 shows that if investment irreversibility is mitigated, ﬁrms would be much more
leveraged (average: 34% → 48%). This implies that the investment irreversibility has a strong
eﬀect on the corporate capital structure as long as it coexists with the costs of outside equity. The
intuition is as follows. Without the costs of outside equity, the ﬁrm does not have to conduct any
ﬁre sale of assets to deal with ﬁnancial distress because outside equity is a cheap way to deal with
it. However, with the costs of outside equity, the ﬁre sale becomes the cheapest way to deal with
the ﬁnancial distress and the degree of investment irreversibility becomes a relevant determinant
of corporate capital structure.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the cross-sectional determinants of corporate capital structure using a
general equilibrium model with endogenous ﬁrm dynamics, a realistic tax environment, and ﬁnancial
frictions. The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, I ﬁnd that the equilibrium ﬁrm distribution in
the model replicates the distribution of corporate capital structure. Second, I ﬁnd that the model’s
stationary equilibrium accounts for the relationship between capital structure, proﬁtability, and
35It is not equal to one because of the constraint (7). Without the constraint, the average leverage becomes one.
33ﬁrm size. In particular, the model accounts for the negative relationship between leverage and
proﬁtability, and its size dependency. The key mechanisms here are economies of scale and two
types of productivity shocks, persistent and transitory.
Finally, the counterfactual experiments conducted using the model provide the following im-
plications. First, even if the tax beneﬁt does not exist, the corporate capital structure would not
signiﬁcantly change, which is in contrast to previous works. This contrast stems from the assump-
tion about ﬁrms’ entry/exit. Second, the eﬀects of the costs of outside equity (the dividend tax
and the ﬂotation cost of equity) on corporate capital structure depend on a ﬁrm’s productivity and
age. With those costs, productive, well established, and large ﬁrms would decrease their leverage
whereas unproductive, new, and small ﬁrms increase their leverage. Third, when I eliminate both
the tax beneﬁt and the costs of outside equity, ﬁrms do not use debt at all. These nonlinear re-
sults imply that the eﬀects of those frictions are highly interrelated with each other. Fourth, the
default cost makes debt ﬁnance unattractive and has a strong eﬀect on corporate capital structure.
This implies that it is important to model endogenous default and its cost when we discuss cor-
porate capital structure. Fifth, the tax disbeneﬁt stemming from the gap between τi and τl
c also
makes ﬁrms prefer equity to debt, implying that the progressive tax rate system in the corporate
income tax aﬀects corporate capital structure. Sixth, the investment irreversibility magniﬁes the
unattractiveness of debt, but it would have no eﬀect on leverage without the costs of outside equity.
As a future work, it is an interesting extension to incorporate aggregate uncertainty into the
model and account for the capital structure behavior over business cycles. Chugh (2010) and Covas
and DenHaan (2011) describes some interesting stylized facts. In addition, Jermann and Quadrini
(2010), using a more parsimonious model, argue that corporate capital structure may play an
important role in explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations. Incorporating an aggregate uncertainty
into this model may provide a more microfounded description about the role of corporate capital
structure over business cycles. Another interesting future work is to investigate the role of cash
holdings by extending the model so that ﬁrms can hold deposits and debt simultaneously.
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37Appendix A: Algorithm to Compute a Stationary Equilibrium
In this subsection, I brieﬂy explain the numerical algorithm that I use to compute the stationary
equilibrium. As mentioned, I set w = 1.0 and Ls = 0.6 in the baseline model as in Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). The basic algorithm to compute the stationary equilibrium in the baseline model
is as follows.
1. Solve the Bellman equations for each ﬁrm under w = 1.0.
2. By the free entry condition, set ce =
R
V (0,z)dλ(z).
3. Calculate the stationary distribution.
4. Using the stationary distribution, we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate labor supply
Ls. Set the mass of entrants M so that the aggregate labor supply is equal to 0.6.
5. Using this mass of the new entrants M and the stationary distribution, we can calculate the
aggregate consumption C. Then, set A so that the ﬁrst-order condition of the households is
satisﬁed.
Appendix B: Algorithm for the Numerical Experiment
1. Guess the equilibrium wage w∗.
2. Solve the Bellman equations for each ﬁrm under w∗.
3. Compare ce and
R
V (0,z)dλ(z). If the entry cost is equal to the value for the entrants (i.e.,
the free entry condition holds), go to the next step. If not, adjust w∗ and go back to the
previous step.
4. Calculate the stationary distribution.
5. Using the stationary distribution, we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate labor supply Ls
and aggregate consumption C. Set the mass of entrants M so that the ﬁrst-order condition
of the households is satisﬁed.
Appendix C: Data
I use COMPUSTAT data for the 10-year period from 1988 to 2008. As other papers using this
dataset have done, I drop some data based on the following criteria. First, I drop ﬁrms in the
ﬁnancial sector and regulated industries because the capital structure in those industries is quite
diﬀerent from other industries.36 I drop observations from the dataset if their SIC code is from
36Chapter 2 of Tirole (2006) reviews these diﬀerences. In addition, Adrian and Shin (2008) show that ﬁnancial
institutions’ behavior in relation to the leverage ratio is quite diﬀerent from that of nonﬁnancial corporations.
384900 to 4999 or from 6000 to 6999. Second, I drop the observations if the number of employees,
book assets, book equity, or book debt is zero or negative.
I use the ﬁrm’s ROA as a proxy for its proﬁtability. ROA in this paper is deﬁned as:
Operating Income Before Depreciation (item 13)
Assets (item 6)
.
In previous papers, some deﬁnitions of the ﬁrm’s leverage are proposed. Among them, I adopt the
following deﬁnition:
Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34) + Long-term Debt (item 9)
Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34) + Long-term Debt (item 9) + Stockholders Equity (item 216)
.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine several deﬁnitions of leverage and discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of each deﬁnition. Then, they argue that the deﬁnition that I adopt in this paper is
closest to the one supposed in the economic model. See Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and
Goyal (2009) for more detail about the deﬁnitions.
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